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Introduction
Comparedwith gasoline- and diesel-powered vehicles,
pure battery electric vehicles (simply, BEVs) are much
more energy efficient, make essentially zero contrib-
ution to urban air pollution, and hold enormous
potential for climate change mitigation [1, 2]. The
climate benefits indeed depend on the greenhouse gas
intensity of the electricity source, but we take it as a
given that decarbonizing electricity is also a policy
priority for jurisdictions serious about EVs. Diffusion
of BEVs is therefore key to reducing global crude oil
consumption, decarbonizing transportation, and
improving urban air quality [3–5].
BEV adoption is supported through various types
of incentives for vehicle purchase, including income
tax credits (e.g. US), vehicle subsidies (e.g. France,
China), exemptions from value-added taxes (e.g. Swe-
den), rebates on annual ownership fees (e.g. Norway),
and waivers from CO2 (e.g. UK) [6, 7]. Some jurisdic-
tions, including California and China, are implement-
ing policies that require vehicle manufacturers to
produce a certain share of zero-emission vehicles or
buy credits from others to meet the requirement.
Finally, BEVs benefit from free public charging, park-
ing, access to toll roads and high-occupancy-vehicle
lanes [6, 7].
While the current policies have increased EV
adoption, they do not fully exploit the potential of
EVs. One reason is that in spite of incentives amount-
ing to about 25% of the vehicle cost, BEVs still seem
costly not only upfront but also on a lifecycle cost
(LCC) basis, a plausible explanation for their slow
adoption [4, 8, 9]. For example, the $7500 US federal
tax credit alone amounts to a 20%–25% discount on
the retail price of popular EVs in the USmarket today.
Even with this level of incentives, at the US average
daily vehicle kilometer traveled (VKT), which is 43 km
per day [10, 11], the payback to EVs relative to a com-
parable pure gasoline vehicle is about a decade long.
Furthermore, when discounting future savings at
10%, the LCC savings are, in fact, negative
(figure 1(a)). For BEVs to even just breakeven on a
LCC basis requires twice the average daily VKT, which
is the 90th percentile of the VKT distribution [11], and
this level of use would still entail a five-year long pay-
back. Of course, these estimates are sensitive to elec-
tricity and gasoline prices but it is clear the economics
are still unfavorable for most private households [12].
This implies current adopters differ in their character-
istics when compared to rest of the society. Even
though battery cost is expected to decline [12], the lar-
ger battery packs required to meet longer driving
range expectations could temper the decrease in
upfront cost of BEVs. Lastly, without a carbon price,
any reduction in gasoline and diesel demand due to a
global transition away from fossil fuels would reduce
gasoline and diesel prices, increasing the payback per-
iod [7]. This implies a sustained—and potentially even
greater—reliance on public subsidies. Recent develop-
ments lend some support to this claim. Under current
US federal policy, the full $7500 subsidy is available
only to the first 200 000 vehicles sold by each auto-
maker. However, efforts are underway to extend the
per automaker cap for the full federal subsidy while
another effort aims to increase the state subsidy Cali-
fornia from$2500 to $4500 per EV [19].
Second, under current policies, BEVs compete
with plug-in hybrid EVs (PHEVs), which offer only a
fraction of the electric driving range relative to BEVs.
PHEVs account for about 50% of all passenger EVs in
the United States, and 47 of the 77 distinct models eli-
gible for federal tax credits are PHEVs, which is an
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implicit subsidy for gasoline or diesel use. (see www.
fueleconomy.gov/feg/taxevb.shtml)
Third, BEV ownership is disproportionately con-
centrated among high-income households and com-
munities. Data fromCalifornia’s Clean Vehicle Rebate
Project suggest that only 6% of the California rebates
for BEVs were captured by households in dis-
advantaged communities [13]. Therefore, under cur-
rent policies, the benefits to low-income households
of BEV policies accrue mainly indirectly through
reduced pollution due to BEV adoption by wealthier
households. Specifically, in the case of income tax
credits, poor households might also not have the level
of tax liability to take full advantage of the tax credits.
Viewed through an equity and environmental justice
lens, policies must change if low-income households
are to benefit directly frompublic support for BEVs.
Indeed, there are other barriers impeding EV
adoption including lack of a widespread fast-charging
infrastructure, which is the reason for the so-termed
range anxiety, credit constraints, limited choice set of
vehicle models, and well-known behavioral failures
that inhibit adoption of efficient technologies with
lower LCC. We relate to some of these issues when we
discuss the merits of the policy innovation we outline
below.
To address these issues and for the simple reason
that payback is inversely correlated with VKT, we sug-
gest pivoting public policies to target high-usage vehi-
cles and applications. As an illustrative example, in the
US, EV payback falls from 10 years to two years when
VKT increases five-fold from the national average of
43–215 km d−1 (figure 1(a)). But high-VKT users who
could benefit from the lower LCC of EVs even in the
absence of subsidies would still face barriers in the form
of range anxiety, while some might additionally also
face credit constraints. However, the stock of private
vehicles with such high levels of VKT is small (about
0.2% of the population in the US) [13] and diffuse,
which in fact weakens the economic case for public
investment in expensive fast-charging infrastructure.
It is in this context that the explosive worldwide
growth of ride services provided by transportation
networking companies (TNC) such as Didi, Lyft and
Uber presents a new opportunity to re-pivot BEV poli-
cies. In 2017, the total VKT of all TNC vehicles in
Figure 1. (a)Payback,Difference in net present value at 10%discount rate, and costeffectiveness ofGHG emission reduction for EV
relative to comparable gasoline vehicle as a function average daily vehicle kilometers traveled (VKT). Also shown are the average daily
VKT forUS based on 2017NHTS and the advertised range for twopopular pure BEVs in themarket—theNissan Leaf andChevy Bolt.
(b)Growth inVKT for EVs andTNC in threemarkets—US, China and India. Growth in TNCVKT ismuch faster relative to growth
in EVmiles. Detailed calculations alongwith data sources and assumptions underlying these charts are in a spreadsheet, which is
attached as supporting documentation available online at stacks.iop.org/ERL/14/091001/mmedia.
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China, India, and the United States was four times the
VKT of all EVs combined in these countries
(figure 1(b)). Although reliable data on average VKT
per TNC vehicle are lacking, the average VKT for con-
ventional taxi cabs in New York City is 304 km d−1
[14], which translates into a simple payback period of
about 1.5 years and a LCC savings of about $28 000 (at
a 10% discount rate) in lifecycle ownership cost sav-
ings after taking into account battery replacement
costs and the US federal subsidy (figure 1(a)). High-
VKT applications also afford greater cushion for BEVs
to absorb the cost of bigger battery packs and remain
competitive despite future increase in fuel economy of
ICE vehicles or a decline in oil price or both.
Although BEVs may deliver significantly greater
lifecycle benefits under such (high usage) conditions,
they entail some unique adoption challenges. A two-
year or quicker payback notwithstanding, the higher
upfront cost of BEVs is plausibly still a barrier for TNC
and taxi drivers who tend to belong to lower-income
households and face credit constraints. Furthermore,
a two-year payback greatly exceeds the expected dura-
tion of employment for the vast majority of TNC
drivers but not for taxi drivers [15]. Secondly, high-
mileage users also require convenient access to fast-
charging infrastructure. The policy approach we
outline below to address these issues. In doing so we
emphasize TNC and taxis, but the policies apply also
to private-use vehicles as well as commercial light duty
vehicles while the basic insight extends to heavy duty
vehicles as well.
The direct approach to target high-mileage users is
to provide a subsidy per-electric VKT (eVKT) along
with an option to finance the incremental cost of EV
purchase through a government loan, that is recouped
in lieu of the subsidy. The per-eVKT subsidy is also a
simple way to avoid implicitly subsidizing gasoline or
diesel miles as is the case with PHEV owners who ben-
efit from lump-sum EV subsidies today. Use-based
subsidies are a targeted way to internalizing positive
externalities that arise from learning-by-seeing and
learning-by-experiencing. High-mileage users of EVs
also provide greater external benefits by creating more
familiarity with the technology by simply being on the
road more. In the case of taxis and ride-sourcing vehi-
cles, they also help potential adopters experience rid-
ing, and also gain actual user insights by potentially
conversingwith the driver.
Although economists have known use-based sub-
sidies to be efficient, actual experience has been mini-
mal plausibly due to the lack of a low-cost reporting
and verification mechanism. Use-based subsidies and
consumer loans for capital investments have each by
themselves been tried in the electric power sector
although the two have not been coupled as suggested
here. For instance, a subsidy per kilowatt of hour elec-
tricity produced, known as a production tax credit
(PTC) in the US, has been shown to accelerate diffu-
sion of wind energy [16]. A loan forfinancing purchase
of roof top solar panels, known as property assessed
clean energy, has been shown to positively impact resi-
dential solar PVdiffusion in theUS [17, 18].
EVs appear a suitable application for use-based
subsidies because low-cost reporting and verification
seems plausible. For instance, TNCs already charge
consumers on a per-mile basis. The California Clean
Miles Standard [20] that requires a certain share of
annual total miles serviced by TNCs to be electric is
predicated on reporting of this information. For pri-
vate VKT, there needs to emerge a simple protocol for
reporting this information, which is already available
to EV owners or is tracked and recorded but not dis-
played to PHEVs owners. This could be accomplished
through a smart phone application or directly relayed
by on-board communication systems to a central ser-
ver belonging to a regulatory agency.
Subsidy per eVKT relates to usage and payback as
follows.
For a given annual eVKT, targeting a quicker payback
implies a higher subsidy and viceversa. For a given
payback, greater the annual eVKT target smaller the
minimum subsidy required. Figure 2 numerically
illustrates these relationship for a Chevy Bolt BEV
relative to an equivalent gasoline vehicle. An average
eVKT of 100 km d−1 requires a subsidy of $0.13 per
km and total subsidy of $5000 for a two-year payback,
which is 33% cheaper than the current US federal
subsidy per EV and delivers more than twice the
reduction in gasoline use and GHG emissions assum-
ing the average EV displaces the average gasoline
vehicle. An average eVKT of 200 km d−1 requires a
subsidy of $0.05 per km and total subsidy of $3400 for
a two-year payback.
A general concern with use-based subsidies for
vehicles is that on the margin it provides incentives to
drive more, which is referred to as rebound effect.
First, this is a second-order effect. Second, the calcula-
tions reveal that such behavior is highly unlikely as the
marginal cost of fuel, maintenance, and depreciation
likely exceeds the subsidy per km even if one ignores
the opportunity cost of time spent driving. Third, one
could also cap the total subsidy per vehicle which elim-
inates an incentive. It is also worth noting that for EVs
that are powered with clean electricity, rebound is not
*
= DD +
∣ ∣
(∣ ∣ )
Payback
Vehicle cost
operating cost per km subsidy per km eVKT
.
annual
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associated with pollution externalities but only con-
gestion externalities potentially. But arguably only a
fraction of the increase TNC and taxi trips adds vehi-
cles because some trips displace private vehicle use and
some trips are shared. That said, the direct approach to
addressing congestion is to price congestion, or creat-
ing targeting incentives for shared-modes and car-
pooling that are independent of vehicle propulsion
technology.
In spite of the advantages of use-based subsidies,
lump-sum subsidies have certain advantages. For
instance, learning-by-doing and scale economies on the
production side are independent of the intensity of pro-
duct use. In such situations, one option is to use lump-
sum subsidies at the early stages after which lump-sum
subsidy is gradually replaced with a use-based subsidy.
A second option is to offer both simultaneously but
mutually exclusively, where adopters self-select into
one of the two schemes. With each of these formula-
tions, policy makers could adjust the level of each type
of subsidy and their timing to depending on budgetary
constraints and the rate of diffusion.
Although the focus here is on making the case for
use-based subsidies, we wish to make it clear that it is
but one instrument within a broader policy ecosystem
aimed at EV adoption in high-usage applications. Sub-
sidy reform needs to be complemented with efforts to
create a wide and dense fast-charging infrastructure
aimed at TNC and taxi vehicles while also ensuring
that facilities that are publically-funded are accessible
to private-use vehicles. Finally, given that mandates
are already being adopted, one can expect this would
induce TNCs to facilitate EV adoption through a com-
bination of innovative vehicle leasing programs and
incentives, and investments in creation of fast-char-
ging network and driver education and awareness pro-
grams. To the extent, use-based subsidies are captured
by TNC drivers, it reduces the incidence of the burden
on the TNC industry.
To summarize, there is a strong case for redesign-
ing EV incentives given sustained high subsidy
requirements, absence of pollution pricing, and most
importantly, the rise of ride-sourcing. Vehicle sub-
sidies appear simpler at the very early stages of diffu-
sion, but the timing is now right for a shift towards
policies that directly targets BEV use. Use-based
incentives together with financial assistance for EV
purchase and creation of a fast-charging infra-
structure, would exploit the proliferation of high-use
vehicles associated with on-demand transportation
Figure 2. (a) Illustrative estimates of subsidy per km required to achieve a given payback period (1, 2, 3 or 4 years). For a given subsidy,
the payback diminishes rapidly withVKT. (b)Total subsidy required until a given time to payback is realized. Detailed calculations
of payback alongwith data and references used in estimation of VKT shares are in the spreadsheet attached as supporting
documentation.
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services while also continuing to support EV adoption
for private household use. Such a shift has the poten-
tial to deliver greater environmental benefits faster,
directly benefit poor households, and can be imple-
mented at low administrative cost.
Data availability statement
Any data that support the findings of this study are
included within the article in the supporting informa-
tion document available online.
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